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David Trafimow corresponding author


The philosophies of Kuhn and Feyerabend not only imply different ways to perform science, they also imply different ways to teach science, particularly at the graduate level. I am especially concerned about teaching at the graduate level in my area of psychology but the argument likely could be generalized outside of psychology. In essence, I argue that teaching graduate level psychology modeled after Feyerabend is better than that modeled after Kuhn.

Kuhn, normal science, Feyerabend, Questioner

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How to Cite
Trafimow, D. (2020). Our intellectual children: Kuhnian Ants or Feyerabendian Questioners?. Advances in Educational Research and Evaluation, 1(2), 88-92.


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