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© David Trafimow, 2020
Psychology Department, MSC 3452, New Mexico State University, PO Box 30001, Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001, USA
How to Cite
Our intellectual children: Kuhnian Ants or Feyerabendian Questioners?
Vol 1 No 2 (2020)
Submitted: Jun 9, 2020
Published: Jul 1, 2020
The philosophies of Kuhn and Feyerabend not only imply different ways to perform science, they also imply different ways to teach science, particularly at the graduate level. I am especially concerned about teaching at the graduate level in my area of psychology but the argument likely could be generalized outside of psychology. In essence, I argue that teaching graduate level psychology modeled after Feyerabend is better than that modeled after Kuhn.